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Abstract
Purpose –The aim of this article is to explainwhy there is a higher degree of trust in some countries compared
to others – and which are the main historical factors that explain these differences. The main focus is on how
governments relate to and communicate with its citizens in the times of crises.
Design/methodology/approach – The analysis is based on comparative historical sociology with a
modernity perspective with a special focus on Norway and Scandinavia. The authors do a parallel
demonstration of history to confirm and expand the theories that could explain the high level of trust in these
countries. The authors also bring in the Spanish experience in order to testify how governmental reactions
affected the different levels of trust.
Findings – Scandinavian governments allowed open communication between different social classes on
difficult and important issues, in contrast to Spain in the same period. These two factors therefore expand the
understanding of the development of trust: (1) The establishment of the nation state as the organising concept
and all-encompassing container of the other institutions (democracy, parliamentarism, trade unions, etc.);
(2) The open hand strategy in dealing with deviant opinions, based on democratic compromises and a policing
of consent ideology.
Originality/value – The article combines the understanding of the first crisis of modernity and the
development of trust and contain a comparative analysis of the development of trust in four different countries.
The investigation thus clarifies the correlation between specific historical factors and the levels of trust.
Keywords Scandinavia, Spain, Norway, Trust, Comparative historical sociology, First crisis of modernity
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
The end of the 19th century signalled a turning point and a crossroads for the development of
modernity in Europe. The early 20th century was a period of conflicts and divisions in most
European countries, triggered by increasing nationalism and class struggle. The analysis in
this article will focus on the way in which the conflicts in the first crisis of modernity
(cf. Wagner, 1994) were handled and how these reactions influenced the level of trust, with a
special focus on Scandinavia.
Trust is thebasis for all communication, facilitating co-operation and communication amongst
people in any society (Tschannen-Moran and Hoy, 2000). Trust can therefore be regarded as one
of the most crucial concepts of public relations (Ihlen and Verhoeven, 2012, p. 170). To be trusted
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democracy requires a certain type of scepticism towards politics, such as when the public
assesses the views and actions of politicians (Inglehart, 1999), and democratic processes are the
most important guarantor of social integration in modern society (Habermas, 1998).
In this article, we attempt to outline some explanations for the high level of trust in
Scandinavia (Norway, Sweden and Denmark), related to political participation and
democracy in the period from 1890 to 1935. The Scandinavian countries have been chosen
for their high degree of trust, while we choose Spain as a comparison for its relatively low
degree of trust (European Social Survey [1]; World Values Survey [2]). We suggest that the
new challenges of the first crisis of modernity threatened the credibility of the authorities and
could verywell undermine the trust between the governments and their citizens. The Spanish
civil war from 1936 clearly exemplifies a lack of trust. At the same time, the Scandinavian
countries were establishing social democratic or social liberal welfare states, indicating high
levels of trust.
Most historical research on trust in Scandinavia has focussed on the popular, democratic
development in Norway (and Sweden) in the 1800s, without comparisons to other countries.
We will analyse the relationship between the governments and their citizens, with a special
focus on communication efforts and conflict resolution and how the crisis was handled by the
governments.
Our principal research question is the following:
How can governmental reactions to the first crisis of modernity explain the different levels
of trust today?
To be able to answer the main question, we will ask three sub-questions:
(1) What are the main historical factors, related to the reactions to public complaints and
deviating opinions during the first crisis of modernity, that can explain the high level
of trust in Scandinavia?
(2) What are the main historical factors, related to reactions to public complaints and
deviating opinions during the first crisis of modernity, that can explain the relative
low level of trust in Spain?
(3) How can governmental conflict resolution during the first crisis of modernity support
and expand our understanding of the level of institutional and social trust?
Methodological and theoretical premises
The analytic approach in this article is comparative historical sociology with a modernity
perspective. A modernity perspective can provide a vertical view of the various dimensions of
societies, such as democracy, economy and politics. Modernity is also a universal topic which
makes it possible to analyse the development of PR and society in a global context (Hu et al.,
2015, p. 263; Dahlen, 2019), and thus to compare different nations. We will do a comparative
historical analysis of the Scandinavian development as a parallel demonstration of history (cf.
Skocpol and Somers, 1980, p. 176) to confirm and expand the theories that could explain the
high level of trust in these countries. We will also use the contrast of context (cf. Skocpol and
Somers, 1980, p. 178) to bring in the Spanish experience, in order to testify how governmental
reactions affected the different levels of trust. In line with the tradition of comparative
historical sociology, we will use the work of historians to serve our sociological end (cf.
Delanty and Isin, 2003, p. 3).
The first crisis of modernity is of special interest when analysing trust, due to the
disembedding of the social and national institutions “of giant scale” (Wagner, 2001, p. 84).
These crises led to reconstructions of social institutions, and therefore radical change in these
social conventions (Wagner, 2012). The governments’ reactions to the most visible protests
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and divergent opinions during the first crisis of modernity are analysed, in order to get an
understanding of the role of governmental reactions and relations to the public.
The understanding of public relations in this article is in line with what Lamme and
Russell (2009, p. 335) call the strategic intent to work for profit (including fund raising),
recruitment (including volunteers), legitimacy, agitation, advocacy and to reduce fear (Russel
and Lamme, 2013). Three elementary principles of public relation should still be in place: (1)
public attention, (2) competition in society and (3) a public sphere. These principles point to
certain social conditions (Bentele, 2015, p. 29) and are normally part of a modern society. PR
activities are further associated with: (1) formal institutions (the state, business and civil
society), (2) public debate and (3) opportunities to exert influence. In keeping with L’Etang’s
(2008) proposition on writing PR history, the outline of this article is centred around “larger
processes of transformation” (p. 321), as well as power relations between dominant and
subordinated groups (Edwards, 2018, p. 6).
The first crisis of modernity is a significant period in the theory of the successive
modernities by Peter Wagner (1994, 2012), where this first crisis is a reaction to the liberal
modernity of the 1800s. A new era, which follows a crisis, solves some of the problems that
existed in the previous era, but new challenges inevitably emerge. Wagner’s analysis is in
many ways a critique of evolutionary modernisation theories and the belief in general
progresses from a universal perspective. The theory creates a more dynamic and actor-
oriented understanding of the historical evolution of the modern – while developing a
contemporary diagnosis for the turn of the century. The first crisis of modernity is followed
by organised modernity from the 1920s and later replaced by today’s liberal, global network
capitalism of the 1970s (Wagner, 1994, 2001, 2012).
In the context of the development of European modernity, where autonomy and self-
determination are political values, “institutions are in need for justification, of a justificatory
discourse” (Wagner, 2003, p. 177), as the nation state as institution needs to be legitimized to
gain public support – and trust. Modern nation states are legitimised through national
democratic processes, where the addressees of laws also are the authors of the same laws
(Habermas, 1996, p. 123). The citizens will feel strongly socially committed, thus maintaining
social integration. And without a historical constructed community, it is difficult to mobilise
for collective action (Ellefsen and Larsson, 2014, p. 32). Wagner (1994, p. 7) claims, however,
that the nation state is first and foremost an instrument to restrict practices and discipline
individuals. Therefore, Wagner (1994, p. 21) believes that the most important challenge in
Western societies is to understand the role of government between power and individual
liberty, to analyse the nation state as amechanism for both individualisation and totalisation.
In keeping with Wagner’s (2012, 2008) theory on successive modernities, we will analyse
the relationship between capitalism and democracy, the relationship between class and
nation as organising principles, and how the workers tried to find their social position in the
new social order in the organised modernity. We will present for each country shortly: (1) the
situation in 1890, (2) the signs of the first crisis of modernity, (3) the authorities’ reactions to
the protests and deviating opinions and (4) the new organisation of societies, in the organised
modernity – and then analyse how the re-organised institutions could built trust. Institutions
are here defined as relatively stable social conventions (cf. Wagner, 1994).
The literature on trust has been reviewed mostly through snowballing: reading the most
relevant articles in the literature lists of already known research on our subject. We have also
done library searches on the terms trust, political trust, general social trust, and trust and
political crisis, in our given historical time frame and for the countries we wished to compare.
Some results were found for the Scandinavian countries, but less related to Spain in the
current time period. We have used historical trust levels as a measurement.
In the present time, finding trust levels is unproblematic. The European Social Survey, the





problematic for our historical time frame, since trust surveys were not performed before the
Second World War. We have therefore taken advantage of some studies with innovative
ways of measuring trust relevant for our time frame. Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011) have
studied trust levels in 77 countries using three instruments: the grammatical rule allowing
pronoun-drop, average temperature in the coldest month and a dummy for constitutional
monarchies. They then compared current welfare state size and found that high-trust
countries were able to finance higher total government expenditures, and that high-trust
countries are characterised by fewermarket regulations. Algan and Cahuc (2010) developed a
new method to uncover the causal effect of trust on economic growth by focussing on the
inherited component of trust and its time variation. They showed that inherited trust of
descendants of US immigrants is significantly influenced by the country of origin and the
timing of arrival of their forebears. They could therefore use the inherited trust of
descendants of US immigrants as a time-varyingmeasure of inherited trust in their country of
origin. Relevant literature on trust is presented in the next section.
Trust in institutions
Trust influences how we understand and perceive information, and it creates a more positive
understanding of the sender and the message (Skirbekk et al., 2011; Skirbekk and Skirbekk,
2012). Without trust, all communication and reception of information will suffer and be
subject to uncertainty and/or scrutiny. Trust may be described as having belief in the
character of a person, the quality of an organisation or the truth of a statement (Giddens,
1990). In a relationship based on trust, people tend to take fewer precautions, and are less
worried about what can go wrong. Consequently, we wish to have trust in others when the
decisions they reach are important to us (Grimen, 2009). Trust is therefore crucial in most
situations where we interact with others and something important is at stake (Gambetta,
1988, p. xi).
A high level of trust is often robust, and general social trust can be inherited and
evolve over long periods, in the sense that it persists over decades within specific
countries and cultures (Putnam, 2000; Inglehart, 1999; Algan and Cahuc, 2010). General
social trust stands in contrast to particularised trust, where people have faith only in a
limited group of the same ethnicity, religion, class, clan or family (Rothstein and Uslaner,
2005, p. 45). There is also a robust and significant relationship between general social
trust and trust in state institutions, such as the police and the judicial system (S€onderskov
and Dinesen, 2016).
Algan and Cahuc (2010) found strong correlations between the levels of trust in the
country of origin of the descendants of immigrants to the United States, and the current levels
amongst the descendants of immigrants. Those with Nordic (and Dutch) origins exhibit the
most trusting attitudes, comparable to the high levels of general social trust in Scandinavian
countries today (shown in updated cross-national surveys). The descendants of immigrants
from Central and Western Europe tend to have less trust, while those with Eastern and
Southern European backgrounds have the lowest level of general social trust. This is also in
line with current surveys of trust levels in European countries (Algan and Cahuc, 2010), as
well as other research (Putnam, 2000; Inglehart, 1999; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005; Skirbekk
and Skirbekk, 2012).
Corruption weakens the belief that conflicts can be resolved, and that criminal acts
involving corruption will be punished. In a society characterised by corruption, one
becomes more cautious when dealing with other people. Further, economic and cultural
equality is also correlated with a high level of trust. There is also a correlation between
political and bureaucratic transparency and the level of trust in governments. Corruption
is one of the main factors that contributes to creating mistrust towards political and
administrative institutions and their executives (Rothstein, 2013).
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Consequently, there are various established explanations regarding what creates trust in
a specific culture or nation, which could be summed up in four points (Rothstein, 2013;
Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005; Skirbekk and Skirbekk, 2012; Wollebæk, 2016; and others):
(1) There should be a fair legal system and as little corruption as possible.
(2) There should be relative equality amongst themembers of society: both economically,
butmore importantly, there should also be a sense of common norms and values. This
also leads to the next explanation.
(3) There should be a common perception of destiny, both historically and for the future.
This includes perceptions of what constitutes facts and challenges.
(4) There should be continuous interaction between the members of a society, and an
active and respected civil society that is able to exert influence. This also means that
there should be the possibility of having dialogues on difficult and important issues
through open decision-making processes.
In the Scandinavian countries, there is a persistently higher degree of trust than in any other
country in theworld, measured both as trust in institutions and in others (general social trust)
(ESS, WVS), whereas in countries in Southern Europe, there is a lower degree of trust.
(Putnam, 2000; Inglehart, 1999; Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005;
Skirbekk and Skirbekk, 2012). Since the level of trust persists over decades, the common idea
that the high level of trust in Scandinavia can be explained by the welfare state in
Scandinavia can be refuted (Wollebæk, 2016; Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2011). It could rather be
explained by the development over centuries and could partly have to dowith the existence of
peace, stability and a relatively fair justice system (Skirbekk and Skirbekk, 2012, p. 59).
Development of high trust in Scandinavia in the 19th century
From the turn of the 18th century in Scandinavia, civil organisations were established, and
many social reforms were developed towards the end of the 1800s. The modernisation
processes in the 1800s – meaning the establishment of such national institutions as
democracy, parliamentarism, bureaucracy and the juridical system – were mainly based on
popular movements, leading to trustful relationships between the civil society and these
institutions.
The Scandinavian democracies were partly based on bottom-up developments, through
popular movements and partly top-down developments of modern reformers, resulting in
integration within the populations and consolidation of the respective nations. The
emergence of popular movements during the early 18th and late 19th century, especially the
workers’, farmers’ and Christian lay organisations, not only contributed to the spread of
literacy but also demonstrated to the ruling class that they were capable of negotiation
without resorting to violent rebellions (Skirbekk and Skirbekk, 2012). They therefore laid an
important groundwork for peaceful debates with the established bourgeois government.
In Norway, Christian lay organisations helped spread literacy amongst the farmers and workers
from the late 18th century. In 1814, after theNapoleonicwars, Norway gained a constitution that was
considered relatively liberal for its time, guaranteeing liberal freedoms of speech and organisation.
Workers’ and farmers’ rights spread during themiddle of the 19th century.Male citizens over 25with
arelativelyhigh incomewereeligible tovote forparliament.By the late19thcentury, thesemovements
had gained control over the Norwegian Parliament, and in 1884, they gained control of the
government. This bottom-up development of modernity and the social movements were of great
importance in establishing trust in thegovernmentand the legitimacyof the ruleof law inScandinavia





Even if the welfare system should not be understood as the main explanation for trust in
Scandinavia, the development of the welfare system in the 20th century reduced the sense of
risk in the population, so that less was at stake when people chose to trust others. And the
trust in the all-encompassing nation states to build expanding welfare states testifies that
there was a high degree of trust in the governments, before the development of welfare states
began (Wollebæk, 2016). Throughout the course of the 20th century, the power of the
sovereign states was limited by the liberal judicial system, which is characterised by the
protection of the individual (Sejersted, 2013, p. 22). This liberal limitation of state power in
Scandinavia can explain the continued strong and persistent trust in government and the
established social institutions. In summary, favourable historical factors have strengthened
the conditions for the other pillars of trust: the rule of law, a strong civil society and a sense of
a shared destiny (Wollebæk, 2016).
We will now try to expand this historical explanation of the high level of trust in Norway
by looking into the first crisis of modernity and comparing the analysis with the development
in the rest of Scandinavia and then Spain.
The first crisis of modernity
A specific characteristic of 19th century European society was the limitations on freedom,
depending on which social class or group one belonged to. There was a striking contradiction
between the universal rhetoric regarding freedom, and the actual strong limitations on the
freedom of the general population. The opportunities to express views and interests within
the political system were limited to the elites who constituted a minority (Wagner, 1994).
There was a liberal capitalism with individual autonomy for capitalists, without democracy
and collective autonomy (Wagner, 2012).
The European working classes in the 19th century struggled to find their own social
position under changing conditions. Prior to this period, they had been excluded from
modernity processes, but were now able to define themselves in their own right, claiming a
place in the newly emerging social order. This resulted in an awareness of social and
economic inequalities and the emergence of ideologies promoting more equal income.
Increasing rationality and the emergence of ideas concerning self-determination and
autonomy then generated efforts to develop structures of collective action and mobilisation.
The first crisis of modernity emerged from these collective reorientations, as social
movements and labour parties with various goals, as well as the rise of labour movements as
institutions for negotiations and legitimate representatives for the workers, as collective
answers to the social changes (Wagner, 1994; Tr€agardh et al., 2013; Strath andWagner, 2017,
p. 153). The limited liberal modernity of the 1800s, with its contradictions and restrictions,
could not be upheld any longer, and Western countries entered a social crisis, as new social
groups were given the possibility of being a part of the modernisation of society (Wagner,
1994, p. 69). The industrial workers and the lower classeswere nowdesignated as the greatest
threat and defined as the others. Concepts and notions such as proletariat and dangerous
classes became part of the discourse and understanding in most industrialised European
countries (Perrot, 1986, quoted from Wagner, 1994, p. 39).
Themain goal of the reformmovements in the latter half of the 19th centurywas to restore
stability and predictability. Many of the established practices ceased and new institutions
were to be built. The outcomewas open, and therewas considerable uncertainty as towhether
a new consolidated order could be established (Wagner, 1994, pp. 57–59). Because of the
economic dynamics in society, many considered it to be in the best interest of workers to
organise themselves by class. Others believed it was a cultural predestination to bring
together linguistic groups into political entities and make these entities the most important
tool for resolving social tensions. Thus, the nation state was established as a phenomenon.
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Throughout the first half of the 20th century, societies were organised by class or nation – as
the available concepts in the restoration of modernity – with more or less successful or
disastrous outcomes (Wagner, 1994, p. 75, 2001, pp. 84–85).
The new form of social organisation emerged, mostly characterised by broader inclusion
and “rational mastery” (Carleheden, 2010, p. 64), and, as J€urgen Habermas describes, as new
regulations of the liberal market economy (Brown, 2017, p. 226). Organised modernity was
initially characterised by specific features thatmade this project both feasible and, in the view
of many actors, a desired goal. There existed consolidated institutions for material allocation,
and authoritative power and significance at the national level. The interpretation of the
negative aspects of societies had been widely accepted. It was agreed that the fundamental
problem of the time was the integration of the masses, and that this task required newmodes
of social organisation (Wagner, 1994, p. 75) – to restore the institutions with greater or lesser
public support and trust.
The Norwegian reaction to the first crisis of modernisation
A striking feature of the political culture in Norway at the turn of the 19th century was that
the ongoing political nationalism was democratic and left-wing, limiting the polarisation
between nationalism and political democracy (Sørensen and Brandal, 2018). The
modernisation offensives of the bourgeois groups reached the consciousness of the
industrial and agricultural workers towards the end of the 19th century in most of Europe,
but earlier in the Scandinavian countries. General suffrage formenwas introduced inNorway
in 1898 and for women in 1913 (Sejersted, 2013, p. 73).
The common perceptions held in Norwegian society during this period were strengthened
by the development of a common public-school system. This system constituted a type of
democratic education that broke radically with the earlier parallel systems, which
differentiated children according to social class (lower and higher classes). The idea
behind the common school was to create schools that offered the same education throughout
the country, where students from all the social classes could intermingle. The aim was to
differentiate students as late as possible, and to provide everyone with equal access to higher
education. However, the transition was a long process, taking place through the greater part
of the 19th century and well into the 20th century.
Norway was the first country in Europe to introduce a five-years common public school
for every child in 1896, while at the same time the requirement for knowledge in Latin, mostly
taught at Cathedral schools, was removed as a requirement of admission to university. From
1920 onwards, Norway had compulsory education from the age of seven to fourteen, while
most of the private schools that the bourgeoisie’s children attended were purchased by the
municipalities. This occurred during the period when the Liberal Party (Venstre) were in
government; in other words, so-called class education was abolished by the introduction of
common public schools in Norway by the Liberal government, long before the Social
Democrats took over governmental power in 1935 (Sejersted, 2013, pp. 78–80).
The national sentiments during the first crisis of modernity emerged in Norway’s struggle
to liberate itself from the Union with Sweden, which was achieved in the dissolution of the
union in 1905. The dissolution of the union created a more unified Norway, despite early
internal struggles. There was widespread agreement in Norway, both before and after 1905,
that the ideal was to have a limited foreign policy, consisting of a peace policy, free trade and
neutrality (Knutsen et al., 2016, p. 96). The agreement on the position of the new state towards
the rest of the world served as a solid foundation formeeting the new challenges that emerged
in the early 20th century. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a Press
Office in 1909. All the political parties, including the social-democrats, liberals and





promote Norwegian interests (Dahlen, 2017). Despite political divisions, this agreement
created a more united society.
There were some revolutionary sentiments around 1920, and theNorwegian Labour Party
was a member of the Soviet Comintern. When the established democratic system was
however able to deal with acute revolutionary threats without the excessive use of physical
force, this undermined possible support for political groups on the extreme left and right
wings of the political spectrum. Consequently, the looming threat of revolution evaporated.
Throughout the 1920s, most revolutionaries left their revolutionary positions and were
integrated into the parliamentary democratic systems (Sørensen and Brandal, 2018,
pp. 129–130).
There were demonstrations, strikes and class conflicts, but the conflicts were mainly
handled in a peaceful manner by the authorities, and violent clashes were rare. The soft
reaction towards strikers and protest may be linked to the basic policing philosophy. The
Norwegian Ministry of Justice expressed the belief as early as 1866 that the esprit de corps of
the Norwegian police should draw its inspiration from the English tradition of policing by
consent, as this would counteract the kind of secret police that engages in covert operations
and is associated with authoritarian states. This normative position can be traced back to the
establishment of theMetropolitan Police in London in 1829 (theMetropolitan Police Act). The
new police services aimed to develop a trustful relationship with the communities and people
they servedwithin the respective countries, so that peoplewould have confidence in the police
(Halvorsen, 2017, pp. 41–42; Ellefsen, 2015, p. 114). There were three basic features of this
new model:
(1) The police should be unarmed: they should not carry firearms.
(2) Numerical inferiority in conflicts, making them depended on conflict-resolution
without use of much violence.
(3) They should be publicly visible through the use of uniforms, but the colour and
design of these should distinguish them from the uniforms of the armed forces. The
public should always know when and in what situations the police were being used,
which would be evident from the police’s use of a recognisable uniform (Halvorsen,
2017, p. 41).
Thus, the police needed to have the consent of the public in order to perform their duties. As
long as the police adopted moral-legal standards in the use of physical force based on
normative standards and not on fear, this contributed to consolidating the role of the police as
a stabilising force in society; and, in the long run, contributed to them being viewed as a
genuine collective good, based on a constitutionally rooted social order (Halvorsen, 2017,
p. 41), making them as a bridge between the government and its citizens at large and thus
building trust.
In the 1930s, strikes and the use of strikebreakers in Norwaywere evidence that therewere
still conflicts within Norwegian society. However, workers’ leaders did not view the trade
unions as instruments of revolution, but rather as a means of ensuring workers’ rights.
A general strike in 1931 signalled an end to the conflict between capital and labour, since a
closer cooperation was developed that eventually led to the establishment of the Basic
Agreement, that is, collective bargaining between management and labour (Kjelstadli, 1994,
pp. 183–187).
The Swedish and Danish reactions to the first crisis of modernity
Denmark and Sweden underwentmany of the same historical developments asNorway in the
current period. There was unrest and political protests and claims for democratic rights from
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bothwomen, farmers andworkers. The farmers in Denmark had joined the urban bourgeoisie
in 1849 in a successful overthrow of the absolute rule, leading to a liberal constitution,
inspired by the Norwegian counterpart, which was the start of the development towards
democracy. Parliamentarismwas established inDenmark in 1901, andwomen got the right to
vote in 1915. In Sweden, 120,000 people went on strike for democratic rights in 1902, and
300,000 workers were on strike in 1909. Most men in Sweden got the right to vote in 1911, the
king lost his political power in 1917, when parliamentarism was established, and Swedish
women got the right to vote in 1921.
During the late 1920s, a number of security measures were implemented in the
Scandinavian countries. Local labour unions were infiltrated, the government performed
espionage on their leaders, and groups of secret conscripted soldiers were established to
respond to revolutionary threats (Bergh and Eriksen, 1998, p. 33; Sørensen andBrandal, 2018,
p. 25). Severe violent conflictswere however rare, and the police in Sweden andDenmarkwere
also inspired directly by the English policing of consent philosophy (Ellefsen, 2015; Ellefsen
and Larsson, 2014). No political murders or causalities were recorded in Scandinavia from
1880 to 1935.
The trade unions in Sweden and Denmark were not as revolutionary as their Norwegian
counterparts and were therefore included earlier into the established political and
parliamentary systems. The social-democratic parties were part of the Danish government
in 1916 and the Swedish government in 1917. The school systems in Sweden and Denmark
also had an early democratic ideology, with common public school from 1903 inDenmark and
from 1919 in Sweden.
During the first crisis of modernity, the three Scandinavian countries went through a
period of social and democratic reforms, based on dialogue and compromises. The people of
the Scandinavian countries gave the all-encompassing states the responsibility for building
the respective nations, with expanding developments reaching back to the early 19th century.
Their welfare states were developed with a high degree of internal agreement between the
various social classes (Kautto et al., 1999, pp. 1–14; Sejersted, 2013; Wollebæk, 2016).
The governments followed up the ambitions from the end of the 19th century by
developing capitalism, democracy and social welfare. Thus, the governments averted the
threat of totalitarian communist and fascist dictatorships that appeared in other European
countries, while at the same time modifying the negative aspects of laissez-faire capitalism.
The Scandinavian model found better answers to the crisis of modernity than unbridled
capitalism and the totalitarian governments of the period. In the social democratic modernity
project, state and society became more or less synonymous – they became interchangeable
units (Sejersted, 2013; Slagstad, 2001; Vedung and Brandel, 2001).
Spain as a comparative case
Spain was plagued by conflicts between monarchists and republicans, and the rise and fall of
different types of regimes in both the 19th and 20th century (Burns and Kamali, 2003, p. 263).
The period between 1874, when Spain had a new constitution, and 1931, is known as the
Restoration Period. The country had in this period a quasi-democracy, with a deliberate
rotation of the Liberal and the Conservative parties in the government. All other parties were
excluded by electoral fraud (Esdaike, 2000). Various governments did not manage to address
the numerous injustices in Spanish society during this period or challenge the interests of the
dominating oligarchy. There were attempts to introduce social improvements, but these
efforts came from above, and not from the civil society (Esdaile, 2000; Salvado, 1999, p. 153).
Spanish society in the late 1800s was characterised by huge differences between the rich
and poor. Only 36% of the Spanish population were literate in 1900 (compared to nearly full





perceptions of how to solve societal challenges. Intellectual groups demanded solutions and
improvements in education from the beginning of the 20th century, but there was still a
greatly divided school system in the beginning of the 1930s, where approximately onemillion
children still did not attend school at all (Flecha Garcıa, 2011). There were violent class
struggles and internal conflicts regarding important political issues. Divergent opinions and
the views of the trade unions were neither respected, nor met with counter arguments.
Workers’ protests and strikes were often met by the physical force of military troops, armed
police and vicious reprisals. During these conflicts, civilians were imprisoned and killed,
political leaders were executed after court martials, and the labour movement in Spain was
repressed (Esdaile, 2000; Salvado, 1999; Casanova and Andres, 2014).
The Spanish political system was characterised by instability and corruption (Esdaile,
2000, p. 188). There was no continuous peaceful interaction over time where crucial issues
could be discussed, or other common public platforms where divergent groups, and their
representatives, could meet. The Spanish state was continually challenged by Catalan and
Basque nationalists. The Spanish military carried out a reign of terror during the period
against the Catalan press and anarchist movements were banned. Prime Minister Antonio
Canavas was killed by an anarchist in 1897, and Prime Minister Jose Canalejas was shot by
another militant anarchist in 1912 (Esdaile, 2000; Salvado, 1999; Casanova andAndres, 2014).
The growing strength of labour movements and democracy did not succeed at the
beginning of the century. Parliamentary democracy appeared to triumph in Spain in 1931
with republicans victorious, but 4,000 miners and civilians were killed bymilitary troops and
the police during the Asturian miners’ strike of 1934 (Esdaile, 2000; Salvado, 1999; Casanova
and Andres, 2014). The instability culminated in the 1936–1939 civil war (Burns and Kamali,
2003, p. 263).
Trust in the first crisis of modernity
In order to restore trust in society’s institutions, the first crisis of modernity was in need of
re-establishing clear conventions to increase the predictability of these institutions (Wagner,
2001, p. 83). We have seen how new institutions first tried to undermine the old institutions
and arrangements, before restoring clear conventions and arrangements, as we have seen the
labour movements as institutions for uprising in the first place and then negotiations and
legitimate representation for the workers in Scandinavia. Most members of the community
experienced these transformations as something that came from outside, something that one
could try to defend against, but not something that one could shape or influence (cf. Wagner,
2001, p. 83). Thus, it is first and foremost the governments’ responsibility to include the
population and restore the predictability of the main institutions.
In research question 1, we asked what the main historical factors are, related to the
reactions to public complaints and divergent opinions during the first crisis of modernity,
that can explain the high level of trust in Scandinavia. Continuous interaction is one of the
four main historical factors explaining the level of trust in a society (point 4 in Table 1),
presented earlier in this article. The possibilities for making changes in society by non-violent
means (e.g. PR) are often dependent on how the state uses physical force. Established society
could meet divergent opinions and revolutionary threats in two ways. One is by using what
we can call an iron fist strategy, that is, by using armed police to stop protests and imprison
protesters. The other is by using what we can call an open hands strategy, that is, including
the deviating opinions of the workers and their movements and initiating reforms and
making compromises with the labour movement. The police forces in Scandinavia were built
on an ideology of consent, in order to build trust between the government and citizen, long
before Edward L. Bernays (1947) introduced “The Engineering of Consent” phrase to the US
business world.
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In spite of the fear of revolution and the securitymeasures, the dominant political response
towards workers in Scandinavia was definitely an open hands strategy (Sørensen and
Brandal, 2018, p. 25). Tolerance for the expression of left- or right-wing viewpoints
strengthened the possibilities for dialogue and compromises. Policing by consent supported
this gradual development of an open, democratic society in Scandinavia and made possible
peaceful transitions of power between the social classes – and then establishing an
all-encompassing nation-state as the main, all-including institution in society, without
repression and total control. This was supported by the common school system, in which
national sentiments, as a purposive strategy, was an important part – and the political
cooperation above party lines, with the governmental co-operation in Sweden and Denmark,
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Office in Norway from 1909.
The transition into modern societies during this period generally followed a relatively
peaceful pattern in Scandinavia, with the development of independence, democracy and the
establishment of civil institutions, based on dialogue, agreements and compromises
(Sørensen and Brandal, 2018, p. 8), rather than armed conflicts, revolutions or civil wars.
And thus, making room for common public attention, competition in society, a public sphere,
public debate and opportunities to exert influence, being necessary conditions for PR
activities (cf. Bentele, 2015, p. 29). It is therefore reasonable to believe that the practice of
public relations, as an alternative to the use of physical force (cf. Bentele, 2015, p. 26), played a
crucial role in this development towards trust between the governments and its citizens.
Algan and Cahuc (2010) suggest that the rise of trust in Denmark and Sweden at the
beginning of the 20th century can be explained by the manner in which the authorities ended
labour conflicts and created welfare states. They point out that “Sweden was marked in the
early 1900s by a world record for days lost in labour disputes and strong class conflicts”
(Algan and Cahuc, 2010, p. 2069). This suggests that there was a low level of generalised trust,
but we will point out that this shows that there was a climate where protest was allowed,
because of the relatively high level of trust between the classes. These open hands policies and
agreements between the parties eventually ended the dramatic labour conflicts and led to the
compromises and establishment of welfare states that enabled trust to be restored.
We will suggest that many observers exaggerate the political conflicts of the beginning of
the century in Scandinavia. Therewere conflicts and disagreements, but therewas also a high
level of trust between the threemainmodern social systems: the state, trade and industry, and
civil society; between the governments, industrial owners and trade unions. There was
extensive co-operation between representatives of the different classes within the national
states and between the governments and the unions – and the labour conflicts were relatively
peacefully handled by the authorities (cf. the police of consent ideology), compared to other
Factors explaining trust Scandinavia, 1890–1935 Spain, 1890–1935
(1) A fair legal system and
little corruption
A fair legal system and little
corruption. Open political decision-
making processes




A gradual development towards
equality
Lack of equality or development
towards equality
(3) Common perception of
destiny, facts and
challenges
National consensus on the main
strategies and goals
National divides and severe class
conflicts
(4) Interaction, dialogue
and a respected civil
society
Peaceful interaction, democracy,
freedom of speech, tolerance of
different viewpoints. Compromises
Violent conflicts over political
disagreements. Imprisonment and
death trails against divergent opinions
Table 1.
Historical factors







countries in Europe, such as Spain. There were crises and conflicts in all European countries,
but the crises in Scandinavia were resolved through dialogue and co-operation within the
common institution, the nation state.
In research question 2, we asked what the main historical factors are, related to the
reactions to public complaints and deviating opinions during the first crisis ofmodernity, that
can explain the relatively low level of trust in Spain. There are striking differences between
how the Spanish authorities reacted to people’s wishes to be a part of the state and modern
society during the first crisis of modernity, compared to the Scandinavian authorities. In the
transition between a liberal and organised modernity, new institutions were formed in both
Spain and Scandinavia, first and foremost representatives of the workers.
In Spain, the workers’ organisations were not respected or included, and large sections of
the population were still kept out of the organisation of the nation state and its organising
institutions, as the political and educational institutions. There was no fair legal system, a lot
of corruption, no economic and cultural equality, a divided perception on facts and
challenges, no continuous interactions, no respected civil society and little respect for protests
and divergent opinions. When the Scandinavian countries organised the society within a
common institutional (national) structure, Spanish society was still divided by severe class
conflicts, hindering continuous interactions (cf. point 4 in Table 1). This was a process that
developed into the 1936–1939 civil war, leading to a sort of dictatorially organisedmodernity.
The nation state was institutionalised under gross repression and total control, lasting
until 1975.
Within Spain there were greatly diverging views regarding values and norms, which
contradicts point 2 in Table 1. A change in the social order was not a desired goal for those in
power in Spain, and perceptions of how to meet the challenges of the first crisis of modernity
and the interpretations of the negative aspects of the current situation in Spain were not
widely accepted (cf. Wagner, 1994, p. 75) which contradicts point 3 (see Table 1). There were
no significant institutions for material distribution on a national level. And it was not agreed
that the fundamental problem of the timewas the integration of themasses, and that this task
required new forms of social organisation (cf. Wagner, 1994, p. 75). There was a development
through a common identity as an industrial worker, but their fight for a full place in society
was almost impossible. The transformations of society came from above without much
concern for the masses. Although there was a degree of parliamentarism in Spain, the
decision-making processes were not very democratic or transparent, and, unlike the
Scandinavian parliamentary-corporative system, the Spanish political system was
characterised by instability and corruption, which contradicts point 1 (see Table 1).
In research question 3, we asked how governmental conflict resolution during the first
crisis of modernity could support and expand our understanding of the level of institutional
and social trust. Workers’ protests and strikes in Scandinavia were often met with reforms
and the adoption of laws benefiting the workers, while protests in Spain were met by the
physical force of military troops, armed police and vicious reprisals from the police and the
military, in order to stop and hinder the population from having their say in the public sphere
and to protest against unjust conditions. During the period of 1890–1935, there were no
political assassinations in Scandinavia, whereas during the same period in Spain, two prime
ministers were shot, and military troops and the police killed strikers and other civilians. The
representatives of the labourmovement in Spainwere repressed by the government, unlike in
Scandinavia, where the social democrats, socialists and communists were incorporated into
common (national) democratic institutions.
The governments in the countries in question tried to make the nation state the main
institutional principle. The Scandinavian countries, however, allowed theworkers to organise
themselves as workers inside themain institution, the nation state. They allowed the workers
to develop their own identity, but gradually included them into the national parliamentary
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system; not by use of violence but by showing them that the political systemwas a useful tool
for all classes and interests, creating a more trustful relationship.
This open hand strategy was based on a democratic and liberal political development and
a policing by consent ideology. Edward Bernays emphasised that “any person or
organization depends ultimately on public approval and is therefore faced with the
problem of engineering the public’s consent to a program or goal” (1947). This strategy can be
easily transformed into governmental relations in general and especially the policing by
consent ideology. The main organising concept of modernity in the Scandinavian countries
was the all-including nation states, where class had a lesser important role. Spain by contrast
remained very much a class society after the first crisis of modernity, and the state was split
into various nations, and especially the Catalans and the Basques were asking (and fighting)
for a more independent status. We have therefore good reasons to believe that the people of
Scandinavia mostly trusted the governmental institutions at the beginning of the 1930s,
whereas the mistrust in Spain led to the civil war from 1936.
The comparison between Scandinavia and Spain can in first place seem quite unfair,
because of the unequal starting points in 1890. The different starting points can however
strengthen the factors presented in Table 1: a fair legal system, a minimum of corruption,
economic and cultural equality, common perception on facts and challenges, continuous
interactions, a respected civil society and – as we have specially noted in this article – the
choice of the nation-state as the main and inclusive container of other institutions, and the
respect for protests and deviating opinions, to the extent that they are not imprisoned and
refused a place in the market place of ideas, as John Stuart Mill put it (Bilgrami, 2009).
Class or nation as the main organising concept
The politicians in power have responsibility for governing public institutions, the legal
system, social welfare, market regulations and so on, all of which depend on public trust if
they are to function well. As democracy requires a certain type of scepticism towards politics
(cf. Inglehart, 1999), theremust be a room for political debate. JurgenHabermas (1998) pointed
out that democratic processes are the most important guarantor of social integration in
modern society: when citizens perceive themselves as the authors of the law, they will feel
strongly socially engaged, thus maintaining social integration and upholding a relationship
of trust with those in power. The citizens, or their representatives, need institutions for
communication, where they can promote new solutions, while criticising and condemning
the old.
There seems to be a strong connection between conflict management on a national level
and the question of maintaining trust, both in governments and institutions and also in
relation to general social trust. Alternatively, the connection can be seen the other way
around: general trust in a society is an important foundation to meet threats and demands
with an open hands strategy, as to be trusted can both be a means and an end for public
relation assessment (cf. Ihlen et al., 2018, p. 422).
We have pointed out two important factors from the first crisis of modernity that may
explain the high level of trust in Scandinavia and the relatively low degree of trust in Spain.
Both point to the already established factor (see point no. 4 in Table 1) of interaction, dialogue
and a respected civil society:
(1) The establishment of the nation state as the organising concept and all-encompassing
container of the other institutions (democracy, parliamentarism, trade unions, etc.).
(2) The open hand strategy in dealing with deviating opinions, based on democratic





This policing by consent ideology can definitely be seen as an early governmental public
relation strategy, in order to legitimate (cf. Lamme andRussel, 2009) themonopoly of violence.
Being unarmed and in numerical inferiority is a way to show an interest in communication
and finding peaceful solutions. The uniforms also showwho they are representing (the state),
and the public and opinion will know how the police treat people with deviating opinions,
which can also be seen as an invitation to debate in the public sphere on the role of the police,
and could help to reduce the suspicion of corruption in government, making room for PR
activities (cf. Bentele, 2015; Lamme and Russel, 2009; Russel and Lamme, 2013).
As the nation state is the main container of other institutions, governmental institutions
have to prove that they are able to justify their acts in front of the population (through both
action and communication), but also be able to listen to critique and to adjust their actions in
order to maintain trust. The alternative is to divide the society into different classes,
hindering the necessary dialogue between different segments of the population, as we have
seen that the demands and protests in Spain were met by an iron fist. The Spanish attempt to
restore social order and discipline during the period led to punishment, violence and mistrust
between the various groups.
The choice between the nation state or class, as the available concepts in the restoration of
modernity, seems to be of uppermost importance for establishing stability, predictability and
dialogue – and therefore trust in society’s institutions. It seems that the core of the
development of governmental trust through the first crisis of modernity lies in this choice,
establishing conflict or unity, bringing the masses into the nation state or not. The
establishment of the nation state and the open hand strategy during the first crisis of
modernity can therefore expand our understanding of the development of trust, in addition to
the four factors emphasised in Table 1. More research could determine if this could serve as a
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